Bergson's thesis on laughter is beautifully simple: laughter is the recognition of our failure to submit life to mechanism. In a joke or a gag, some plan or schema breaks down. Knock-knock jokes create in us an anticipation that the punch line brings to an abrupt end. Slapstick characters are restricted to such a narrow range of movements that they are defeated in the simplest of tasks. A speaker who repeats the same gestures is funny because, while his thoughts seem to be fluid and to change with the progression of his speech, his physical expression lags behind it. Things that are funny always concern a discord between what we had planned and what is actually occurring, between expectation and contingency, and so ultimately between mechanism and vitality. At the heart of the comic is a profound absentmindedness. We laugh when it seems as though life had forgotten to move forward and instead skipped and repeated itself like a broken record. In this way, laughter unites our most trivial encounters (a banana peel on the road) with the greatest flights of intellectual abstraction so that we may suppose that anyone who laughs has arrived at a metaphysical insight into the relation of spontaneity and repetition, life and art, or even being and event.
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With all the resurgence of interest in Bergson's work, it is strange that his essay on Laughter is still largely overlooked. This long essay or short book published in 1901 occupies an unusual place in Bergson's oeuvre. It continues themes already begun in Matter and Memory -the breakdown of sensory motor schemas, the subtractive nature of perception, the relation of mind and body -and it offers some of Bergson's most interesting insights on the tension between mechanism and vitalism that informs all of his work. Laughter anticipates the critique of science that he would later develop in Creative Evolution and shows us that Bergson's concerns about mechanical thought are not a romantic throwback to the pre-industrial age, but are based on the more exciting prospect that passing through the wasteland of mechanism will offer us some new insight into what sort of covenant we might make with the means -the gestures, languages and machines -in which our lives transpire.
For all these reasons Laughter remains compelling and instructive. Why then does it receive so little interest? It is remarkable, for instance, that Deleuze's highly influential Bergsonism contains nothing about the essay.
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I suspect that this lack of interest may be due to its strong moralizing impulse. Under the otherwise inventive and illuminating essay is a weak sociology of moral regulation. Society demands flexibility, Bergson concludes, and laughter is a way of singling out whatever cannot bend with the contingencies of life and, through derision, of correcting it. Of course, we need to be aware of the political nature of derisive, contemptuous and 'totalitarian' laughter. But it is by no means obvious that 'society' demands flexibility. Couldn't we argue, after all, that what society demands is routine, predictability and order? Or, shouldn't we at least historicize Bergson's image of society and see whether some social orders require flexibility, and others not? Bergson the sociologist is as disappointing here as he is later in the Two Sources of Morality, the other text that receives little attention -all of which raises the difficult matter of how we should read this essay today and how we might balance its metaphysical and moral dimensions. To this end I have found it helpful to consider a distinction, proposed by the literary critic James Wood between a pre-modern, theological humor that is based on a comedy of correction and a modern, secular humor of sympathy. 4 An older, religiously inspired humor assumes an air of superiority and advantage over the subject at whom we are invited to laugh. This is the basis of comedy for Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Schopenhauer and countless others. A very different kind of comedy emerges with the modern novel that has as one of its central aims the cultivation of forgiveness or sympathy. This may be easily summarized as the difference between laughing at someone and laughing with him or her. The modern novel gives us characters who are free to contradict themselves without being corrected by the author.
To clarify this distinction Wood invites us to consider one of the most compelling images in Bergson's essay on comedy. In a section in which he discusses the 'anesthetics' of laughter, Bergson explains that that we have to cease to care about a thing in order to laugh at it. It is enough to plug our ears to the music while watching dancers perform in order to see the comic absurdity of their actions. Wood suggests that in this passage Bergson imagines that we view dancers with an air of superiority. We have an advantage over them since we know what they do not, namely how silly they now appear without the accompanying music. But what if, Wood goes on to ask, the watcher knew nothing of the music and saw instead a set of bizarre, unintelligible movements? He would not feel superior but might think that he was watching some macabre dance of death in which he was directly implicated. In these two very different scenarios we have the difference between a comedy of correction and a comedy of forgiveness, or sympathy.
